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ABSTRACT
A firm's deferred tax position can influence how it is affected by a transition from one tax regime to
another. We compile disaggregated deferred tax position data for a sample of large U.S. firms between
1993 and 2004 to explore how these positions might affect firm behavior before and after a pre-announced
change in the statutory corporate tax rate. Our results suggest that the heterogeneous deferred tax positions
of large U.S. corporations create substantial variation in the short-run effect of tax rate changes on
reported earnings. Recognizing these divergent incentives is important for understanding the political
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Conventional wisdom holds that corporate executives support lower statutory corporate 
tax rates because after-tax corporate earnings would be higher if tax rates were lower. While this 
statement is an accurate long-run characterization for most firms, the short-run effects of a 
corporate tax rate reduction can differ widely across firms. These disparities, the result of 
differences in the tax circumstances of different firms, can potentially affect a firm’s support for 
rate reduction. 
When Congress debated corporate tax reform in 2004, survey evidence suggested that 
executives at a majority of firms supported rate reduction and preferred it to other tax reform 
options. Yet some large firms with substantial deferred tax assets that would have been revalued 
if the statutory corporate rate were cut lobbied successfully against such a cut. Hanna (2010) 
reports: 
 A corporate tax rate cut would cause a small group of manufacturing companies, 
on behalf of which the representatives were lobbying, to take an immediate charge 
or "hit" to earnings—thereby reporting lower quarterly net income and lower 
earnings per share (EPS). So even though a rate cut would benefit these 
manufacturing companies in future years, a current charge to earnings was 
unacceptable… 
 
In part as a result of this lobbying effort, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA) 
included a complex domestic activities production deduction that had the approximate effect of a 
rate cut but that did not reduce the statutory tax rate and therefore did not require write down 
their deferred assets and liabilities. This episode illustrates how deferred tax positions, and the 
incentives they create for some firms, can play an important role in the analysis of corporate tax 
transitions.
1  
                                                 
1 Variation in firm circumstances with respect to deferred tax assets and liabilities are just one factor that might lead 
to variation across firms in support for a corporate rate reduction. A firm that had just completed an extensive 
investment program and expensed many of its investment costs, but was about to begin receiving the earnings from 2 
 
  Several recent studies, including Shackelford, Slemrod, and Sallee (2009) and Edgerton 
(2010), examine whether managers focus attention on accounting earnings as well as cash flow. 
Robinson (2010) studies the market for low income housing tax credits and finds that, holding 
the tax benefit of the credit constant, firms will incur additional costs to obtain preferred 
accounting treatment. Managers appear willing to forego cash flow to raise pretax book income.  
This paper aims to better understand the potential effect of deferred tax positions on 
corporate behavior and the way these positions may affect managerial preferences regarding 
corporate tax reform. Deferred tax asset or liability positions recognize the estimated future tax 
effects attributable to one type of difference between book and tax income, past temporary 
differences. The difference between reported pretax income and estimated taxable income is 
comprised of temporary, permanent and other differences. Temporary differences result from 
discrepancies in the timing of income and expense recognition for book and tax purposes. They 
affect a firm’s cash flow for taxes both when they arise and when they reverse. The anticipation 
of this future reversal gives rise to the recorded deferred tax position. How a corporate tax 
reform will affect a firm's reported earnings in the year of its enactment, and how the firm may 
choose to react to the tax reform, depend in part on the sign and magnitude of its net deferred tax 
position. We collect data on the amounts and components of deferred tax assets and liabilities for 
the largest public U.S. corporations between 1993 and 2004. Our sample firms account for nearly 
forty percent of the aggregate market capitalization of the U.S. corporate sector in 2004.  
The presence of deferred tax assets and liabilities not only matters for understanding the 
transitional impact of statutory tax rate changes on different firms, but also complicates the task 
                                                                                                                                                             
these investments, might be particularly supportive of a rate reduction. A firm that had undertaken similar 
investments but had been unable to fully expense the investments, because of tax loss carryforwards, would be 
relatively less supportive since the value of its carryforward claims would be reduced, along with the tax liabilities 
on its future earnings, by such a change.  3 
 
of estimating the revenue impact of a corporate tax change. Deferred tax positions generate 
additional incentives for firms to re-time their recognition of income around tax changes; this 
may in turn affect tax revenue. When tax rates are scheduled to decline, firms with large deferred 
tax assets have an incentive to accelerate the recognition of income to utilize deferred tax 
benefits at the currently high tax rate. For firms that have neither deferred tax assets or liabilities, 
and that are currently taxable, the prediction is reversed. These firms have an incentive to defer 
income until the low-tax regime takes effect.
2 For firms with large deferred tax liabilities, the 
incentive is in the same direction as for currently taxable firms, but even stronger. These firms 
have an incentive to defer income to the anticipated low-tax regime since by doing so they can 
discharge their deferred liabilities at the lower statutory tax rate. 
Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson (1992) and Guenther (1994) study the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 (TRA86), which reduced statutory corporate tax rates, and find that many taxable firms 
delayed reporting of income to take advantage of the new, lower tax rate. Maydew (1997) finds 
that firms generating Net Operating Losses in the years immediately following TRA86 delayed 
income recognition or accelerated deduction recognition to increase their losses, thereby moving 
the refunds from the carryback into a tax year with a high statutory rate. These results suggest 
that firms engage in shifting income across time periods when there are pre-announced changes 
in statutory corporate tax rates, and that the nature of these shifts depends on the firm’s particular 
tax position. 
                                                 
2 To shift taxable income, firms must often shift cash flow and occasionally book income as well. For example, 
firms may increase taxable income by accelerating the recognition of revenue, by accelerating the receipt of 
prepayments, or by slowing payment of non-recurring expenses; the first method impacts book income while the 
latter two affect cash flow. Financial reporting incentives—either to report higher income now, to smooth income 
over time, or to report lower income in order to preserve cushion for the future—may conflict with or exacerbate 
incentives to minimize tax liabilities. For example, the incentive to report higher current revenue for financial 
purposes conflicts with the standard tax-minimizing incentive to delay recognition of taxable income around a tax 
rate reduction. 4 
 
When tax rates or other relevant features of the tax code change, firms must revalue their 
deferred tax positions. This revaluation flows through current period accounting earnings (Net 
Income). As the size of U.S. corporations’ deferred tax positions increases, the potential for 
revaluation of these balances to materially affect Net Income. While we focus on the impact of 
corporate tax changes, another recent example—the passage of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010—illustrates the potential importance of these changes. Leone 
(2010) explains that this legislation removed a tax benefit firms received by providing retiree 
drug benefits and required restatements of deferred tax assets related to the benefit that has been 
removed. For AT&T Inc, this restatement decreased book income by $1 billion and caused 
analysts, such as Credit Suisse, to issue guidance for investors on how to interpret this noncash 
charge. These anecdotes provide support for the suggestion by Mills (2006) and Neubig (2006), 
among others, that concerns about how potential legislation bearing on taxes and other issues 
will change reported income as a result of revaluations may be an important determinant of 
whether corporate executives support such proposals.  
This study explores the potential influence of deferred tax positions on the way firms 
respond to tax changes and on the incentives managers may face when they lobby with regard to 
tax policy. While we do not examine the political actions of firms, we suggest that a political 
economy perspective on firm behavior might offer useful insights on corporate support for, and 
opposition to, various corporate tax reforms.
3 We construct and describe components of assets 
and liabilities for large corporations. We identify all public firms that are in the Fortune 50 
between 1995 and 2004 and carefully construct comparable entities for the period 1993 to 2004 
                                                 
3 We focus on temporary differences, rather than permanent differences, because permanent differences do not 
accumulate over time in the form of deferred tax assets or liabilities. They do not create incentives with regard to tax 
policy transitions in the way that temporary differences do. The full impact of a permanent difference is recognized 
in the period when the underlying income-generating activity takes place. 5 
 
by combining merged companies prior to the merger and divested companies after the 
divestiture. For this set of 81 “super-firms,” we then catalog the components of their deferred tax 
positions so we can investigate changes within category and in total for each firm. 
Hand-collection is necessary because the available machine-readable balance sheet data 
has historically encoded only the long-term deferred tax liability disclosed on the balance sheet, 
rather than the net deferred tax position and the components disclosed in the tax footnote. While 
the most recent Compustat data format includes net deferred tax positions, the process of 
backfilling prior years that were not originally collected is not yet complete. This data field is 
populated in the Compustat data file for only 50.9 percent of the firm-years in our sample. The 
machine-readable data file therefore does not permit analysis of short-term deferred tax liabilities 
or any deferred tax assets. This makes it impossible for researchers to measure the magnitude of 
deferred tax assets that are likely to influence the amount of lobbying for or against prospective 
tax rate changes, or the extent of income shifting that might take place as firms try to utilize 
NOLs when faced with a statutory tax rate reduction. 
The aim of our study is to calculate the size of net deferred tax asset and liability 
positions in order to allow policy-makers to better understand the potential revaluation effects 
facing large U.S. corporations. We also provide evidence on how changes in temporary 
differences—both aggregate temporary differences and specific types of such differences—are 
linked with the recent rise in the difference between reported pretax book income and estimated 
taxable income (the book-tax gap). 
Our analysis has three parts. First, we measure both the total book-tax gap and the portion 
of the gap attributable to temporary differences. Our hand-collected firm-level data set enables us 6 
 
to overcome missing-data problems that are common in the standard data source, Compustat.
4 
Our findings suggest that temporary differences account for a substantial share of the book-tax 
gap. When we stratify our data by year, we find that in every year, more than half of the book-tax 
gap for the median firm in our sample is attributable to temporary differences.
5 Additionally, 
both the fraction of firms in our sample with a net deferred tax liability and the size of the 
average net deferred tax liability rise substantially during our sample. Thus, growth in temporary 
differences appears to contribute to the widening of the book-tax gap. As a firm’s deferred tax 
position rises relative to its non-tax assets and liabilities, the firm is likely to be more sensitive to 
proposed changes in statutory corporate tax rates.  
Second, we disaggregate deferred tax positions into categories in order to understand 
whether the recent growth in the book-tax gap attributable to temporary differences is observed 
over most of the components that contribute to temporary differences, or is driven by a few 
specific types of temporary differences. This disaggregation provides the first detailed analysis 
of the components of deferred tax positions for a significant and relatively constant sample of 
firms over an extended period of time.
6 Key contributors to the increase in the book-tax income 
gap include mark-to-market adjustments; property, including leases and both tangible and 
intangible property; and valuation allowances.  
                                                 
4 We use current tax expense to calculate the book-tax income gap and deferred tax expense to calculate temporary 
differences. In our hand-collected data set, current tax expense (deferred tax expense) is non-missing and non-zero 
for 92.4 percent (91.2 percent) of our firm-year observations. Compustat current tax expense, calculated as the sum 
of federal, foreign, and state current tax expense—Compustat codes TXFED, TXFO and TXS, respectively—is non-
missing and non-zero for 74.8 percent of the firm-years in our sample; Compustat deferred tax expense, calculated 
as the sum of federal, foreign, and state deferred tax expense—Compustat codes TXDFED, TXDFO and TXDS, 
respectively—is non-missing and non-zero for 62.6 percent of the firm-years in our sample.  
5 The residual (Book Income less [(Current plus Deferred Tax Expense)/0.35]) should be attributed to permanent 
and other differences as well as to measurement error. Tax expense not clearly disclosed as current or deferred (for 
example, tax expense due to Discontinued Operations or disclosed only by jurisdiction) will be included in this 
residual measure. 
6 Amir, Kirschenheiter, and Willard (1997) collect similar data on the size and components of deferred tax positions 
but only study the period 1992-1994. Phillips, Pincus, Rego, and Wan (2004) study a longer period, 1994-2000, but 
study a random sample of firm-years in this period. We collect data for a relatively constant set of firms over a long 
period, which allows us to make across-time comparisons.  7 
 
Finally, we interpret the data we collect on deferred tax assets and liabilities in the 
context of the behavioral and political economy incentives surrounding a tax rate change. We 
find that a pre-announced reduction in the corporate tax rate would give a third of the firms in 
our sample a strong incentive to accelerate income to the high-tax period. Moreover, many of 
these firms have taxable income in the current period, which suggests that they are likely to have 
the capacity to make such a shift. While we are unable to estimate how much income would be 
shifted in response to such incentives, and the incentive to make such a shift would depend on 
the size of the rate change, the nontrivial share of firms with such an incentive and the rising 
value of loss carryfowards, suggests that analysts should consider the revenue impact of rate-
change-motivated income shifting when they estimate the short-run revenue effect of a change in 
the statutory corporate tax rate.  
We also estimate the impact of a change in the statutory corporate tax rate on Net Income 
to demonstrate how such a change might influence the incentives firms have to lobby for or 
against pending tax legislation. For the average firm in our sample, reducing the statutory federal 
corporate income tax rate from 35 to 30 percent would result in a $328 million increase in 
reported Net Income as a result of revaluation of deferred tax positions. There is, however, 
substantial heterogeneity across firms. More sample firms would report an increase than a 
decrease in Net Income from revaluations associated with a reduction in the statutory corporate 
tax rate. Among those that would report an increase, the average impact of a rate reduction to 30 
percent would be $677 million. For firms with a net deferred tax asset, however, the rate 
reduction would induce an average reduction of $315 million in Net Income. Our results quantify 
a potentially important transitional effect of corporate tax reform on Net Income—the 
revaluation effect of deferred tax positions—that policy-makers may want to consider as they try 8 
 
to target transition relief in prospective tax legislation to the various types of firms that may be 
affected by policy changes.  
  We divide our analysis of temporary book-tax differences into five sections. The next 
section—section two—explains how temporary differences generate deferred tax assets and 
liabilities. This background is particularly important for non-accountants. Section three describes 
the data set that we have assembled from a sample of SEC filings, identifies a number of 
potential data limitations and presents summary statistics. Section four disaggregates the book-
tax gap, both to estimate the importance of temporary differences within our sample and to 
provide details on the most significant components of temporary differences. Section five 
examines how the sum of past temporary differences can affect book income when tax policy 
changes induce revaluations. A brief conclusion explores implications of our findings for tax 
policy and suggests future research. 
II. TEMPORARY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BOOK AND TAX EARNINGS 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 109 (SFAS 109) provides guidance for the 
calculation of tax expense. Following the “matching principle,” a central concept of accrual-basis 
accounting which states that expenses should be matched to the period in which they give rise to 
revenue rather than to the period in which they arise or are paid, SFAS 109 stipulates that the 
total tax expense reported in a period should be the estimate of total income taxes due on the 
pretax book earnings of that period. Generally, accounting earnings reported to investors in a 10-
K differ from taxable income reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on Form 1120, so 
the total tax expense reported in the 10-K will not equal taxes currently due to the IRS. 
  While book income and taxable income may differ for a number of reasons, they can be 
separated into two broad categories: permanent differences and temporary differences. 9 
 
Permanent differences arise when a component of income enters one earnings measure but is 
never included in the other. For example, all forms of interest income are included in pretax book 
income but interest on tax-exempt state government bonds is excluded from taxable income. This 
exclusion is an example of a permanent difference. In contrast, temporary book-tax differences 
are the result of disparities in the timing of when an income component is included in book and 
taxable income. For example, bad debts are estimated and expensed for book purposes in the 
period in which the associated revenue is recognized, but bad debts are not deducted for tax 
purposes until specific receivables are written off. 
SFAS 109 requires the calculation of two components of total tax expense, current tax 
expense and deferred tax expense. Current tax expense measures income taxes due in the current 
taxable year, while deferred tax expense measures income taxes due in all future taxable years. 
Total tax expense equals the sum of current and deferred tax expense. Permanent differences 
primarily affect the calculation of total tax expense by adding to or removing from book income 
items that will never be a component of taxable income, such as interest on state government 
bonds, non-deductible fines, and the domestic manufacturing deduction. This implies that total 
tax expense equals the statutory corporate tax rate times taxable book income less tax credits and 
other rate adjustments. Taxable book income equals pretax book income less permanent 
differences.
7  
If a company had permanent differences but no temporary differences, then it would have 
no deferred tax expense. Its total tax expense would equal its current tax expense. When a 
company has temporary differences, a portion of its total income tax expense that would be 
                                                 
7 We refer to tax credits and other rate adjustments that affect current tax expense reported in the financial 
statements but not taxable income reported on Form 1120 as “other differences”. These other differences confound 
our measure of taxable income because we are forced to estimate taxable income from 10-K-reported current tax 
expense. 10 
 
currently due to the IRS based on current period taxable book income is deferred. Temporary 
differences essentially reclassify a portion of tax expense from current tax expense to deferred 
tax expense. For example, consider a firm with $100 of accelerated tax depreciation in excess of 
straight-line book depreciation. Its current-period taxable income will be $100 lower than it 
would have been absent this deduction. As a result of this temporary difference, a tax expense of 
$100*τ that would have otherwise been due on current taxable book income will be due in some 
future tax period. In one or more future years, the firm’s straight-line book depreciation will 
exceed its tax depreciation, taxable income will exceed book income, and the $100*τ of 
previously-deferred tax expense will become due. When the full amount of the deferred tax 
related to a temporary difference has been paid or received, the temporary difference is said to 
have ‘reversed’. 
Because temporary differences create a reclassification of tax expense between current 
tax expense and deferred tax expense, they do not affect the total dollars of tax that will be paid 
over the life of the firm or the total tax expense that is recorded in the company’s financial 
statements. Temporary differences only affect the timing of tax payments. Each temporary 
difference affects the calculation of taxable income and tax due to the IRS in at least two years—
once in the year when it arises, and again in the year or years in which it reverses. In the 
foregoing depreciation example, the $100 of accelerated tax depreciation in excess of book 
depreciation created a current-year book-tax difference, as well as a future, opposite-signed 
book-tax difference when it reverses. While temporary differences affect both taxable income 
and cash flow for taxes in at least two years, in the absence of revaluation due to changes in tax 
rates or laws, temporary differences do not affect total tax expense or book income. 11 
 
Because temporary differences represent a future obligation to pay cash to or receive tax 
relief from the IRS, they must be accounted for as financial assets or liabilities. Deferred tax 
asset and liability positions accomplish this; deferred tax positions equal the current statutory 
corporate tax rate times the sum of differences that will reverse in the future. Firms for which 
pretax book income has exceeded taxable income have a net deferred tax liability (DTL): these 
firms have an accumulation of ‘favorable’ temporary differences that have allowed them to defer 
tax expense to a future period and this deferral has created a liability to the government. Firms 
for which taxable income has exceeded pretax book income, in contrast, have a deferred tax asset 
(DTA); they have an accumulation of ‘unfavorable’ temporary differences that have forced them 
to accelerate tax payments and they are therefore entitled to future tax relief. 
A firm’s end-of-period deferred tax position is equal to cumulated temporary differences 
times the statutory corporate tax rate expected to be in effect, under currently enacted laws, when 
the temporary differences reverse.
8 When expected tax rates are constant through time, a firm’s 
deferred tax expense equals the current statutory tax rate times temporary book-tax differences 
that arise or reverse in the current period.
9 When tax rates change, SFAS 109 requires firms to 
revalue net deferred tax positions and to include these revaluations in book income through the 
deferred tax expense or benefit.
10  
To illustrate the revaluation principle, consider a firm with one relatively new asset 
subject to accelerated tax depreciation relative to book depreciation and no other temporary 
                                                 
8 Under SFAS 109, temporary differences are recorded without discounting to reflect the elapsed time until reversal.  
9 This is a simplification of the balance sheet approach of SFAS 109 for expositional purposes. It does not hold 
when the statutory rate changes, merger activity occurs, or in certain other settings. SFAS 109 actually requires the 
deferred tax expense to be calculated as the change in the firm’s net deferred tax position, rather than as the current 
period’s temporary differences times the statutory rate.  
10 Revaluation of the deferred tax balance flows through Net Income regardless of whether or not the creation of the 
deferred tax balance affected net income. For example, deferred tax expenses associated with unrealized gains and 
losses on available for sale securities affect Other Comprehensive Income rather than Net Income but revaluation of 
these positions would nonetheless affect Net Income.  12 
 
differences. In the year when it acquires this asset, the firm records a deferred tax expense and 
liability related to this asset in the amount of τ*(depreciation1, book-depreciation1,tax), where the 
subscript denotes the age of the asset (with 1 denoting the year of its purchase) and the type of 
depreciation, tax or book. This expression indicates that at some point in the future the 
accelerated tax depreciation deduction will be less than the book depreciation expense and then 
the IRS will expect to receive additional tax at the rate of τ. Similarly, in the next year, the 
deferred tax liability related to this asset will increase by τ*(depreciation2,book-depreciation2,tax). 
The firm now has a deferred tax liability due to the IRS of Σj=1,2  τ*(depreciationj,book-
depreciationj,tax). When τ changes to τ', not only does the layer added by this year’s difference 
between book and tax depreciation change, but also the balances previously recorded change 
because the IRS will now expect to settle this liability at τ', rather than at τ. The new liability 
recorded on the balance sheet will equal Σj=1,2 τ’*(depreciationj,book-depreciationj,tax). Assuming 
that the deferred tax expense for year 2 was recorded at the historic rate τ, an adjustment equal to 
Σj=1,2 (τ – τ’)*(depreciationj,book-depreciationj,tax) will be reported in book income. In this example 
of a net deferred tax liability position, a tax rate decrease will cause the liability to decrease and 
Net Income to increase. If the firm had a net deferred tax asset position, the effect of a rate 
change would be reversed.  
We study temporary differences by analyzing reported deferred tax positions. Three 
features of SFAS 109 that affect these reports are particularly significant for our study. First, 
firms must report both deferred tax assets and liabilities, not just a net deferred tax position. 
Deferred tax positions are categorized as current or non-current based on the underlying asset or 
liability that gave rise to that position. Deferred tax positions are aggregated based on this 
classification and both a net current deferred tax asset or liability and a net non-current deferred 13 
 
tax asset or liability is presented on the balance sheet. Second, firms must adjust their reported 
DTAs and DTLs when laws change, in particular to reflect changes in statutory corporate tax 
rates. For many firms, and for many but not all components of deferred taxes, a reduction in the 
statutory corporate tax rate would reduce DTLs (DTAs) and thereby have a positive (negative) 
effect on reported earnings. Third, firms must report a valuation allowance that reflects the 
probability of realizing deferred tax assets.
11 This permits an assessment of the potential tax 
benefit associated with a deferred tax asset.  
  Disaggregating deferred tax assets and liabilities makes it possible to study many aspects 
of deferred tax positions, but we are aware of only four studies that have moved beyond 
machine-readable data to examine the components of the deferred tax account.
12 Phillips, Pincus, 
Rego, and Wan (2004) explore which types of deferred tax positions reveal aggressive financial 
reporting. They find that changes in deferred tax positions related to revenue and expense 
accruals and reserves are particularly likely to signal aggressive financial reporting. Givoly and 
Hayn (1992) study how share prices of firms with deferred tax liabilities reacted to the corporate 
tax rate reduction in the 1986 Tax Reform Act. They find that the decline in corporate rates had a 
favorable effect on the market value of firms with deferred tax liabilities, after controlling for the 
other effects of tax reform. Chen and Schoderbek (2000) distinguish changes in deferred tax 
positions that were triggered by the 1993 corporate tax rate increase from other changes to 
deferred tax positions. They find that analysts reacted in roughly the same way to both types of 
changes, even though the persistence and predictive power of the two are likely to differ. Finally, 
                                                 
11 A valuation allowance is a contra-asset account that reflects the value of deferred tax assets that are not likely to 
be recognized. (A contra-asset is an account that is entered on the asset side of the balance sheet even though it has a 
credit balance. This is done to reflect that the credit—negative—balance in the contra-asset offsets some debit—
positive—balance in the associated asset account. The valuation allowance contra-asset decreases the value of the 
deferred tax asset.) The deferred tax asset is netted with the valuation allowance to assess the firm’s expected future 
tax benefit. 
12 Several studies analyze a portion of the deferred taxes. For example, Miller and Skinner (1998) and Bauman, 
Bauman, and Halsey (2001) study the valuation allowance related to deferred tax assets. 14 
 
Amir, Kirschenheiter, and Willard (1997) find some evidence that market participants consider 
the source of deferred tax positions in valuation. We follow these studies in disaggregating 
deferred tax balances, but we focus on how temporary differences change over time and on how 
they affect the income statement rather than market values.  
III. DATA COLLECTION 
  Machine-readable data, such as the deferred tax liability balance recorded by Compustat, 
measure firms’ deferred tax positions with substantial noise. Until recently, Compustat collected 
deferred tax liabilities that were separately stated on the face of the balance sheet, but it omitted 
deferred tax positions reported as assets or included in other liabilities, thereby preventing 
researchers from identifying firms with net deferred tax assets or from accurately measuring the 
position of firms with net liabilities.
13 Compustat’s new database format (termed 
‘Fundamentals’), introduced in 2007, collects data on net deferred tax positions as well as the 
balance of short-term and long-term deferred tax assets and liabilities.
14 This dramatically 
improves the ability of researchers to measure net deferred tax positions. However, the 
Fundamentals dataset does not yet contain data for all firms for all years.
15 Our dataset has many 
advantages over the historical Compustat format (termed ‘Legacy’). Relative to Fundamentals 
Compustat, its primary advantage is its completeness.  
                                                 
13 For example, the 2005 balance sheet for Kimberly-Clark reports a current deferred tax asset of $223.4 million and 
a long-term deferred tax liability of $572.9 million. Legacy Compustat only collects the liability disclosed on the 
balance sheet of $572.9 million. Even if Compustat had also collected the balance-sheet-disclosed current asset of 
$223.4 million, the user would not have been able to tie to the footnote-disclosed net deferred tax liability position 
of $121.4 million because of deferred tax positions included in other assets on the balance sheet. 
14 In the 2005 Kimberly-Clark example of the previous note, Fundamentals Compustat collects $223.4 million for 
short-term deferred tax assets, $228.1 million for non-current deferred tax assets, and $572.9 million for long-term 
deferred tax liability as well as the net deferred tax liability position of ($121.4) million. 
15 Fundamentals Compustat has backfilled tax data for a number of firms and continues to backfill fairly rapidly 
(nearly 30 percent of our sample was populated during the first six months of 2010.) However, only 50.9 percent of 
the valid observations during our period have a non-missing value for Net Deferred Tax Balance. We found that 
96.9 percent of the Net Deferred Tax Balances collected by Compustat are approximately equal to the Net Deferred 
Tax Balances we hand-collected. 15 
 
A second limitation of machine-readable data is that it does not allow detailed 
component-based analysis of deferred tax asset and liability positions. As part of our study, we 
endeavor to provide evidence about which types of differences have contributed to the rise in the 
book-tax gap. Neither Fundamentals Compustat nor Legacy Compustat includes information on 
the type of temporary difference which created the deferred tax position. 
We collect data from the tax footnote in 10-K filings for FORTUNE 50 firms for fiscal 
years between 1993 and 2004. Our sample begins in FY 1993 because it is the first year when all 
firms’ financial statements were prepared in accordance with SFAS 109, which took effect for 
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1992. FORTUNE ranks firms by gross revenue.
16 Our 
sample includes both financial and non-financial firms. Since we are interested in tracking 
deferred tax positions over time, we use the annual FORTUNE 50 lists to construct a panel data 
set. For any firm in the FORTUNE 50 in any of our sample years, we collect data for the entire 
sample period. There is moderate turnover in the FORTUNE 50. Only 25 of the firms in the 
1995 FORTUNE 50 were in the 2004 FORTUNE 50. Nine of the 50 firms on the 1995 list were 
acquired between 1995 and 2004. In a typical year, five firms leave the FORTUNE 50 for 
various reasons. One hundred firms appear in the FORTUNE 50 at least once between 1995 and 
2004. We drop four firms from this group: State Farm Insurance and TIAA-CREF, private 
companies that are not required to file 10-Ks, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are 
government-sponsored enterprises. This leaves a sample of ninety-six firms.  
  Corporate control transactions complicate the problem of tracking FORTUNE 50 firms 
through time. Sample firms acquire other firms, or in some cases are themselves acquired. When 
this occurs we collect data on the acquired or acquiring firm for years prior to the acquisition. To 
                                                 
16 Prior to 1995, FORTUNE rankings included only manufacturing firms. To avoid including firms that are only in 
the FORTUNE 50 due to the exclusion of non-manufacturing firms, we formed our sample using the FORTUNE 
rankings from 1995-2004. 16 
 
preserve data comparability over time, we create “super-firms” by combining the distinct 
accounts of the two firms that subsequently consolidated. This process is designed to minimize 
discrete changes in deferred tax positions that are due to acquisitions. However, no methodology 
we know of will completely eliminate these changes because the merger itself can create 
deferred tax assets and liabilities.
17 
  Because most of the companies acquired by FORTUNE 50 firms are companies that are 
not part of the FORTUNE 50, constructing super-firms involves data collection on many small 
companies. This increases the number of firms in our sample in at least one year to 420; these 
firms combine to create 81 super-firms. Due both to limited availability of electronic filings in 
the early years of our sample and to the non-traded nature of some firms, the number of super-
firms in our sample rises from 71 in the first year (1993) to 78 in the final year (2004). Appendix 
A lists the individual firms in our sample. Our analysis relies on super-firms rather than 
individual companies as our units of observation to preserve comparability across years. 
  SFAS 109 mandates: (i) an income tax summary, which details the significant 
components of income tax expense; (ii) a rate reconciliation, which reconciles reported income 
tax expense with the amount that would result from applying the domestic federal statutory rate 
to pretax income; and (iii) a schedule of deferred tax positions, which provides information about 
DTAs and DTLs. Firms also are expected to disclose information regarding the amounts and 
expiration dates of loss and credit carry-forwards, the division of tax expense between continuing 
operations and all other items, the composition between domestic and foreign earnings before 
                                                 
17 Our super-firm methodology will minimize differences due to non-taxable mergers accounted for as a pooling-of-
interest. However, a non-taxable merger accounted for as a purchase will result in stepped-up basis for book but not 
tax purposes, increasing deferred tax liability positions. While our methodology, computing the change between the 
merged firm and the sum of the target and the acquiring firm, will usually reduce the change relative to considering 
a change between the merged firm and the acquiring firm only, our methodology does not always eliminate the 
change caused by the merger. 17 
 
income taxes, and temporary differences for which the firm has not recorded a deferred tax 
liability, including permanently reinvested foreign earnings. 
We match each firm-year observation with Compustat using both firm name and year, 
and validate the match using total assets and Net Income.
18 We collect the tax summary, rate 
reconciliation, and the schedule of deferred tax positions from tax footnotes. There is substantial 
variation across firms in the level of detail presented in the tax footnote, although most firms 
follow a fairly stable reporting policy from year to year. Appendix B describes our procedure for 
disaggregating DTAs and DTLs into their component parts.  
  There are several data limitations inherent in our approach to collecting and 
disaggregating the components of deferred tax assets and liabilities. First, our procedure is 
limited by the level of disclosure provided in the 10-K. Firms who disclose relatively few line 
items or use vague language hamper our categorization efforts. Second, SFAS 109 is a world-
wide consolidated firm disclosure. Most firms are taxed in multiple jurisdictions, but they do not 
make jurisdiction-specific income tax disclosures. Rather than allocating DTAs and DTLs across 
jurisdictions in an arbitrary fashion, we assume that all DTAs and DTLs relate to federal 
temporary differences. Finally, there may be heterogeneity across firms in the auxiliary 
assumptions that are used to compute and present the value of DTAs and DTLs. We do not have 
any information regarding the detailed calculations underlying the tax footnotes, so we are 
unable to address such potential heterogeneity or its effects.  
IV. SUMMARY FINDINGS 
                                                 
18 We collected tax information from the first 10-K or annual report filing for each fiscal year. Restatements may 
cause differences between the total assets and net income entries in the 10-K and those reported in Compustat. We 
hand-checked the 48 firm-years where neither Compustat codes AT nor NI corresponded to our hand-collected total 
assets and net income numbers. The majority of differences were due to small restatements. We dropped 17 firm-
years, 15 for which Compustat did not have any data and two where a stub year or merger caused a mismatch. 18 
 
We begin our analysis by reporting summary statistics. Table 1 reports aggregate and 
median values of the estimated book-tax income gap, temporary differences, and the share of the 
book-tax income gap attributable to temporary differences for our super-firm sample. We define 
the book-tax income gap on a world-wide basis as Pretax Income less estimated Taxable Income, 
where Taxable Income is defined as Current Tax Expense divided by the maximum U.S. 
corporate statutory tax rate (35 percent throughout our sample). We calculate temporary 
differences as Deferred Tax Expense divided by 0.35. We present and discuss two alternative 
calculation approaches in Appendix C. The share measure equals the book-tax gap due to 
temporary differences divided by the total book-tax gap. While Compustat in principle collects 
the data necessary for both of these calculations, we find that Current Tax Expense in 
Compustat, which we calculate as the sum of TXFED, TXFO and TXS, is missing or zero for 
25.2 percent of the firm-year observations. By comparison, Current Tax Expense is only missing 
or zero for 7.6 percent in the comparable set of firm-years in our hand-collected data. Deferred 
Tax Expense in Compustat, which we calculate as the sum of TXDFED, TXDFO and TXDS is 
missing or zero for 37.4 percent if the firm-year observations; it is missing or zero for 8.8 percent 
of the firm-year observations in the comparable component of our dataset. Given these 
discrepancies, we use hand-collected data for the calculations throughout the paper.  
[insert Table 1 around here] 
The third through fifth columns of Table 1 present medians. The median share 
attributable to temporary differences is the median of (estimated temporary differences/estimated 
total book-tax gap), calculated at the super-firm level. For the median firm in our sample, the 
share of the imputed book-tax difference attributable to temporary differences varies across 
years, ranging from 61.3 percent in 1994 to 93.2 percent in 1999. In every year, however, 19 
 
estimated temporary differences comprise the majority of the estimated book-tax gap for the 
median super-firm in our sample. 
In columns six through eight of Table 1, we report aggregate statistics. The aggregate 
share attributable to temporary differences is calculated as the sum of temporary differences 
across super-firms divided by the sum of the book-tax gap across super-firms. This measure 
offers further insight into the distribution of temporary differences. For example, in 2001 the 
median super-firm reports a positive book-tax gap and positive temporary differences but the 
aggregate figures are both negative. Just slightly less than half of the sample firms, 43.6 percent, 
report a negative book-tax gap in 2001. On average, the negative values are significantly larger 
($2.942 billion) than the positive values of the book-tax gap, which average $1.814 billion. The 
difference between the median and the aggregate (or the mean) arises because firms with large 
book-tax gaps or large temporary differences are more influential in the computation of the 
aggregate measure than in the computation of the median. For instance, the very large aggregate 
share attributable to temporary differences in 2002 is driven by AOL Time Warner Inc., which 
reports a book-tax gap of ($46.254 billion) but temporary differences of only ($1.42 billion).
19  
Even though the aggregate ratio is less stable than the median ratio, both measures yield a similar 
inference:  temporary differences are the largest component of the book-tax gap for the firms in 
our sample. 
Table 2 presents additional information on the total market value and assets for the firms 
in our sample. Market Value of Equity is calculated as Compustat Common Shares Outstanding 
(CSHO) multiplied by fiscal year-end price (PRCC_F); all other variables are hand-collected. 
                                                 
19 There is not a lone culprit for the negative share attributable to temporary differences in 1998 but rather three 
super-firms that report large negative book-tax differences and either a small negative or a positive book-tax gap: 
Citigroup, IBM, and Johnson & Johnson. Removing these three super-firms results in an aggregate book-tax gap of 
$9.588 billion, 28.4 percent of which is attributable to temporary differences. 20 
 
With regard to market value of equity (assets), our sample represents 39.2 percent (41.9 percent) 
of the Compustat universe in 2004 and averages 41.2 percent (40.3 percent) over our whole 
sample period. 
The last four columns in Table 2 show the number of firms in each sample-year that 
report net deferred tax assets, the number that report net deferred tax liabilities, and the total 
value of these net deferred tax positions. The data demonstrate the heterogeneity in firm tax 
positions, as well as the evolution of these positions through time. In 1993, 31 of 72 super-firms 
report net deferred tax assets that total $52.2 billion, while the remaining 41 report net deferred 
tax liabilities totaling $79.7 billion. The proportion of net DTL firms increases through our 
sample period, and in 2004, 27 of 78 super-firms report net DTAs. While Neubig (2006) cites a 
recent survey that suggests that the majority of surveyed firms prefer a lower corporate tax rate 
to other incremental or fundamental tax reforms, Table 2 suggests that there is a significant 
minority of firms that would experience at least one adverse effect of such a rate reduction—a 
decline in the value of their DTAs.  
 [insert Table 2 around here] 
  Table 2 suggests that the share of firms with net DTLs rose during our sample period. A 
net DTL, indicating cumulative book income higher than taxable income, could be due to a 
number of factors, including but not limited to aggressive financial reporting which raises pretax 
book income and aggressive tax reporting which lowers taxable income. In addition to showing 
an increase in the proportion of firms with a net DTL, the table also shows that firms with a net 
DTL have larger deferred tax positions than firms with a net DTA. In 1993, the average net DTL 
is $2.0 billion while the average net DTA is $1.7 billion. The average net DTL increases by 122 
percent during our sample period, to $4.4 billion in 2004, while the average net DTA increases 21 
 
by only 42 percent. This is consistent with the increase in DTLs over our sample period that was 
evident in Table 1. 
Tables 3 and 4 explore the increases in temporary differences that have contributed to the 
rise in the book-tax income gap and present detailed information on the composition of deferred 
tax positions. Table 3 disaggregates deferred tax positions into their constituent components, and 
indicates the sources of the most important temporary book-tax differences. Table 4 separates 
DTA positions from DTL positions for components that do not consist almost exclusively of 
either assets or liabilities. We report means of these disaggregate measures to facilitate 
comparison across years with different sample sizes. 
[insert Table 3 around here] 
The results in Table 3 suggest some variation over time in the key sources of deferred tax 
positions within our sample. The most important source of deferred tax liabilities is Property. 
Early in the sample, the most important source is Benefits, which includes benefits related to 
current employees as well as retiree health benefits and pensions. This is not a surprise, because 
our sample begins in 1993 shortly after SFAS 106, Accounting for Other Postretirement 
Benefits, required firms to record liabilities for unfunded retiree medical costs. In the following 
decade, many companies eliminated or scaled back such coverage, thereby decreasing the DTA 
values associated with Benefits. By the end of the sample in 2004, Credits and Carryforwards 
replaces Benefits as the most significant deferred tax asset, although Benefits remains a major 
contributor. Although the economy had substantially recovered by 2004, many firms likely still 
have unused loss and credit carryforwards from the economic downturn of 2001.  
While the overall ranking of various components of deferred tax assets does not change 
dramatically between 1993 and 2004, the magnitude of certain categories does. For example, 22 
 
deferred tax positions related to mark-to-market adjustments rise and fall with the general equity 
market. NOL Carryforwards increase 248 percent while Other Tax Credits and Carryforwards 
increase 148 percent, consistent with the extension of the carryforward period under the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Deferred tax liabilities related to Property, Plant and Equipment 
(PPE) increase 45 percent. Possible explanations for the rise in PPE include special “bonus tax 
depreciation” that took effect in 2001 as well as the implementation of SFAS 142, which 
removed book amortization of intangible assets. Liabilities related to Intangible Assets and 
Leases rise 113 percent and 77 percent, respectively. Intangible Assets includes goodwill and is 
likely a result of substantial merger activity recently. Some fraction of the rise in leasing-related 
deferred tax components may reflect a rise in either, or both, of aggressive financial and tax 
reporting using leased assets. Table 3 also shows that book revenues rose relative to tax revenues 
during the 1990s, a result consistent with Plesko’s (2004) study. The data in Table 3 suggests 
that the increase in temporary differences that contributed to the rise in the book-tax income gap 
was not driven by a single source, but was instead the result of increases in many deferred tax 
liabilities including Property,  Subsidiary-Related Items and Valuation Allowance (the latter 
being a contra-asset). 
In addition to describing which categories have contributed most to the rise in temporary 
differences, Tables 3 and 4 offer insight into the deferred tax positions that managers might try to 
control if they foresee changes in statutory tax rates. Between 1993 and 2004, the stock of 
deferred tax assets related to total loss and credit carryforwards increased nearly 200 percent. 
While much of this increase was offset through increases in Valuation Allowances, the rise in 
loss- and credit carryforward-related deferred tax positions still suggests in the event of a pre-23 
 
announced decline in the corporate tax rate, there would be strong incentives to accelerate the 
recognition of income, and thereby to utilize carryforwards before the statutory tax rate declines.  
Table 4 separates deferred tax assets from deferred tax liabilities for sub-categories that 
include substantial assets as well as liabilities. Some categories, such as Revenue-Related, appear 
relatively small in Table 3 when the net deferred tax positions are presented, but represent a 
significant deferred tax asset for some firms and a significant deferred tax liability for others. For 
example, a firm that receives cash but has not yet provided the service may have to pay income 
tax on that cash but does not record revenue until the associated goods or services are delivered, 
and so will record an unearned revenue liability and a corresponding deferred tax asset. A firm 
with installment sales, for which it recognizes a gain for book purposes when the sale closes but 
recognizes the gain for tax purposes as the payments are received, will have a deferred tax 
liability. Disaggregating into the asset and liability positions for certain categories also allows us 
to see the effect of changes to book or tax calculation of these items.  
SAB 101, published in late 1999, tightened guidelines regarding how companies can 
recognize revenue; SAB 104, published in late 2003, further curtailed aggressive financial 
recognition of revenue. Evidence in Table 4 is consistent with both of these pronouncements—
the upward trend in the DTL for Revenue-Related slows beginning in 1999 and even reverses 
beginning in 2002.
20 Table 4 presents additional detailed information that may be helpful in 
understanding the contribution of temporary differences to the increase in the book-tax income 
gap.  
 [insert Table 4 around here] 
                                                 
20 An alternative explanation for the observed trend in Revenue-Related deferred tax positions that we cannot rule 
out is the slowing economy in the later years of our sample. 24 
 
  The foregoing tables suggest that temporary differences are a significant portion of the 
book-tax income gap and provide evidence on the components of these temporary differences. 
We now explore the size of deferred tax positions relative to assets. This normalization is helpful 
for judging the importance of DTAs and DTLs relative to the book value of the firm. Table 5 
reports the distribution of net DTAs and DTLs as a share of firm assets for each super-firm and 
for each individual firm. The net deferred tax balance is substantial for many firms. In 2002, for 
example, 35 percent of both super-firms and individual firms reported a net deferred tax position 
in excess of five percent of assets. Although the table does not show it, almost ten percent of 
both individual firms and super-firms had a net deferred tax position exceeding ten percent of 
assets. For super-firms, the maximum (minimum) net deferred tax position as a function of assets 
occurred in 2004 (1995) and was 14.5 percent (-31.9 percent). Overall, Table 5 suggests that 
while the majority of firms have a small deferred tax position relative to total assets, a nontrivial 
number have a more significant position. 
[insert Table 5 around here] 
  Table 6 presents information similar to that in Table 5, but it distinguishes financial and 
non-financial firms. We have not separated these two groups in our earlier tables because we did 
not find a significant difference between them in the average (unscaled) size of the deferred 
balance positions or in the percent of the book-tax gap attributable to temporary differences. 
However, in Table 6, we separate financial and non-financial firms; their balance sheets appear 
to be affected differently by deferred tax positions.  
[insert Table 6 around here] 
Financial firms have relatively smaller deferred tax positions than non-financial firms, 
largely because their base of financial assets is so large. In every sample year, more than three-25 
 
quarters of the financial firms in our sample have a net deferred tax position, either positive or 
negative, that represents less than three percent of total assets. About half of non-financial firms, 
in contrast, have deferred tax positions in this range. The extreme values of the ratio of deferred 
tax positions to firm assets are also smaller for financial than for non-financial firms. The 
maximum (minimum) net deferred tax position relative to assets for a financial firm occurred in 
1994 (1997) and was 16.2 percent (-18.5 percent) while the maximum (minimum) net deferred 
tax position relative to assets for a non-financial firm occurred in 2001 (1995) and was 48.0 
percent (-46.3 percent). For financial firms, the net deferred tax positions as a percentage of 
assets are distributed more tightly around zero than are the comparable positions for non-
financial firms.  
V. TEMPORARY DIFFERENCES AND FIRM BEHAVIOR  
The presence of deferred tax positions on a corporation’s balance sheet may affect 
several aspects of firm performance and create a range of incentives for firm behavior. We now 
describe several consequences of the presence of temporary differences. To focus attention on a 
concrete policy setting, we consider a situation in which the statutory corporate rate is expected 
to decline.  
A.  Income Re-Timing Incentives  
All firms face incentives to alter the timing of reported income in the periods 
immediately surrounding a tax rate cut. Absent deferred tax considerations, firms will increase 
the present value of their after-tax income by shifting income from the period prior to the rate cut 
into the future in order to pay tax on that income at the lower future rate.
21 The presence of 
                                                 
21 Guenther (1994) discusses nontax costs that limit this type of tax rate arbitrage, including the cost of reporting 
lower financial income for debt covenants and management compensation. We acknowledge these constraints but do 
not measure them. Our estimates of the percent of firms who are likely to shift for NOL CF purposes may be 26 
 
deferred tax liabilities should exacerbate this incentive—firms will also want to delay the 
reversal of deferred tax liabilities so the liability is settled at a lower rate than currently recorded. 
Firms with deferred tax assets, however, will want to receive the deferred benefits at the higher 
tax rate and so have an incentive to accelerate income to the period before the tax rate reduction.  
Many firms hold deferred tax positions related to NOL carryforwards—they have carried 
the NOL as far back as is allowed and some NOL remains to offset taxable profits in future 
periods. In 2004, 37 percent of the individual firms in our sample had a beginning-of-year, NOL 
carryforward-related DTA that would likely be affected by a federal rate cut.
22 While firms with 
deferred tax assets related to NOL carryforwards have a strong incentive to create income in the 
final higher-tax-rate period in order to receive the benefit of the NOL carryforward at the higher 
rate, some firms with a net NOL carryforward may be unable to shift income. We assume that 
firms reporting taxable income have more scope to accelerate income than do firms currently in a 
tax loss position. In 2004, three of the firms with a net NOL carryforward are estimated to be in a 
tax loss positions, leaving 26 of the 78 firms with both a beginning-of-year net NOL 
Carryforward and positive estimated taxable income. This calculation suggests that nearly one 
third of our sample would have an incentive to accelerate income, as well as some capacity to do 
this. We are unable to extend this analysis to estimate the dollars of income these firms are likely 
to shift. However, Maydew’s (1997) finding that the average firm in his sample shifts $11.2 
million of income, or 1.5 percent of Net Sales, in response to a 12 percent decrease in the 
corporate income tax rate suggests that the re-timing of corporate income associated with a 
change in statutory tax rates could be large enough to warrant revenue estimators considering 
                                                                                                                                                             
considered an upper bound for the percentage of firms who are likely to undertake income shifting into the higher 
tax regime. 
22 This calculation excludes disclosed state and foreign NOL carryforwards as well as carryforwards disclosed 
together with a tax credit (i.e., Credit and Loss Carryforwards.) The latter exclusion may cause us to understate the 
percentage of firms with a federal NOL carryforward. 27 
 
such rate-motivated income shifting in their estimates of the short-run revenue effects of a 
change in the statutory corporate tax rate.  
B.  Preference for Tax Rate Change 
 Temporary differences generally do not affect book income, while they do affect cash 
flow. Both when they arise and when they reverse, temporary differences affect the allocation 
between current and deferred tax expense and therefore affect cash paid for taxes in the current 
period. In most cases, the effect when the difference is recorded and when it reverses are equal 
and opposite. For example, when taxable depreciation exceeds book depreciation, cash outflow 
for taxes decreases, increasing cash flow relative to a situation in which book and taxable 
depreciation are equal. When this temporary difference reverses, book depreciation exceeds 
taxable depreciation and cash outflow for taxes increases. Both when the temporary difference 
arises and when it reverses, the temporary difference does not affect book income but does shift 
cash flow. 
However, when tax rates change, the firm must revalue its deferred tax asset or liability, 
which in turn affects book income. Neubig (2006) and Mills (2006) argue that firms are very 
sensitive to the impact of tax reform on their reported earnings and recognize the potential 
income effect through revaluation of DTAs and DTLs. Managers who will report lower earnings 
as a result of these revaluations may be particularly concerned that analysts may inadvertently 
assume that these one-time effects are persistent—a concern supported by Chen and 
Schoderbek's (2000) study of deferred tax revaluations around the 1993 tax rate change.  
We illustrate the potential Net Income impact of deferred tax position revaluations with a 
counterfactual example in which the federal corporate income tax rate drops by five percentage 28 
 
points in 2004.
23 Using the data in Tables 1 and 2, we estimate the revaluation of beginning-of-
year deferred tax positions. We do not allow for any income shifting associated with the rate 
change, since we do not have a shifting elasticity to apply in this setting. We limit the sample to 
just those firms that report federal income tax separately. This limited sample includes 80.8 
percent of our firm-year observations, representing 81.8 percent of sample adjusted net deferred 
tax positions. The revaluation calculations exclude deferred tax positions related to tax credits, 
including foreign tax credits. Because credits directly offset tax liability, rather than taxable 
income, a rate change will not affect their valuation. 
Our results are presented in Table 7. A lower tax rate reduces federal tax expense on 
current period income and increases the period’s Net Income; we refer to this as its “direct 
effect.” This is a persistent and long-lived effect of the rate reduction. If the 2004 corporate tax 
rate had been reduced to 30 percent, the direct effect would have reduced federal tax expense by 
$147 million for the average super-firm. The average super-firm’s Net Income in 2004 was 
$3,625 million, so this reduction in tax expense represents an increase in Net Income of 4.1 
percent.  
[insert Table 7 around here] 
In the year of the rate change, Net Income reflects both the direct effect and the 
revaluation effect. While we might expect the deferred tax revaluation to be second-order, for 
many firms it is considerably larger than the direct effect of the tax rate change. Our estimates in 
Table 7 suggest that for the average super-firm, the revaluation of 2003 deferred tax positions 
                                                 
23 While many other changes in the business environment, including changes in Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles, also affect deferred tax positions, we consider a statutory rate change because it is broadly applicable and 
its impact is relatively easy to estimate. 29 
 
would have increased 2004 Net Income by $328 million, or 9.0 percent.
24 Our average super-
firm would have experienced a 13.1 percent increase in Net Income—two-thirds of which would 
have been attributable to the revaluation effect. This effect, not surprisingly, differs across firms. 
For firms with net DTAs, the write-down of net DTA decreases Net Income, offsetting the 
positive Net Income effect of the reduction in the current period’s tax expense. For net DTL 
firms, on the other hand, the revaluation reduces the value of a balance sheet liability, which 
increases their Net Income. Net DTA super-firms in our sample would on average experience a 
$315 million revaluation decrease in net DTA and Net Income.
25 The lower tax rate would have 
decreased these firms' current tax expense and increased their Net Income by $103 million. On 
net, these firms would report a $212 million earnings decrease due to the rate change, a 7.7 
percent decrease in their average Net Income of $2,755 million. Firms in our sample with a net 
DTL would experience, on average, a $677 million dollar revaluation decrease in their net DTL, 
and a matching Net Income increase.
26 They would also report $171 million less in taxes on 
income generated in the current period. DTL firms average $4,097 million of Net Income in 
2004. For net DTL firms the revaluation effect reinforces the direct tax expense effect. Net 
Income rises, on average, by 20.7 percent for our sample firms with a net DTL.  
  Although our estimates of DTAs and DTLs provide some guidance on the effects of 
statutory rate changes, there are several reasons for caution in evaluating our estimates. First, our 
assumption that all DTAs and DTLs relate to federal temporary differences may lead to some 
overstatement of the effect of U.S. federal income tax rate changes. Second, not all DTAs and 
DTLs are affected by statutory rate changes. Tax credit carry-forwards, for example, are not, 
                                                 
24 In results that are not reported here, we found that the median revaluation effect in 2004 would have increased net 
income by 2.1 percent - still substantial, but considerably lower than the mean effect of 9.0 percent.  
25 The median revaluation effect in 2004 for Net DTA firms would have decreased net income by 4.2 percent. 
26 The median revaluation effect in 2004 for Net DTL firms would have increased net income by 6.3 percent. 30 
 
because they are applied after the tax rate. We address this concern by removing credits from 
base deferred tax positions where possible when we estimate the revaluation effect of a tax rate 
change. We make the conservative assumption that any disclosure which includes credits, such 
as “Net Operating Loss and Credit Carry-forwards,” is comprised entirely of credits.  
C.  Deferred Taxes and Corporate Tax Reform 
A change in the corporate tax rate would affect firms through many channels. Our 
analysis highlights one aspect of corporate tax reform that is often overlooked: changes statutory 
rates will affect firms by requiring revaluation of their deferred tax assets and liabilities. This 
"temporary differences" channel will have divergent effects on firms with net deferred tax assets 
and those with net deferred tax liabilities, and it may lead their respective managers to have 
different reactions to tax reform and to pursue different strategies to shift income from the old to 
the new regime. Anecdotal and other evidence suggests that managers are sensitive to the impact 
of tax reform on reported earnings. Our findings suggest that for some firms, the effects of some 
corporate tax reforms on the value of deferred tax assets and liabilities can be substantial. 
Managers at firms with significant net deferred tax assets may lobby against statutory corporate 
tax rate cuts if they are primarily concerned with the short-term effect of such policy changes on 
reported after-tax income.  
The political history of tax policy changes is replete with examples of corporate groups 
with closely-aligned incentives affecting policy design. In the introduction, we cited Hanna's 
(2010) description of the corporate tax reform debate of 2004. Pressure from firms with 
accumulated net operating losses was one factor in Congress’ decision to enact a "qualified 
production activities” deduction rather than a reduction in corporate tax rates. For firms with 
large net deferred tax assets positions, a rate cut would have generated substantial tax expense. 31 
 
Less than two months after the passage of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) published its interpretation of the qualified production 
activities deduction as a special deduction, rather than a tax rate reduction, under SFAS 109. 
While firms with deferred tax liabilities would have preferred FASB treat the new qualified 
production activities deduction as a tax rate reduction, FASB’s treatment is additional evidence 
that firms are concerned about the financial statement impact of tax rate changes.  
In a different context, Neubig (2006) notes that one concern some firms may have about 
expanding investment incentives by adopting expensing for tax purposes is that expensing 
creates deferred tax liabilities that could be subject to revaluation if the corporate tax rate 
changes in the future - an  event that some managers may seek to avoid. 
  Ohio’s recent corporate tax reform further illustrates how firms with substantial deferred 
tax positions may affect the tax legislative process. The reform legislation included three distinct 
forms of transition relief for firms that would lose deferred tax assets when the corporate income 
tax was replaced by a gross receipts tax. First, firms operating in Ohio under the income tax 
regime were encouraged to schedule the reversal of their temporary differences during the phase-
out of the corporate income tax. To the extent that any temporary items would not reverse by the 
end of the phase-out, an adjustment for the estimated deferred tax position at the end of the 
transition period was recognized in income in the period in which the phase-out began. Second, 
certain deferred tax assets, primarily research and development tax credits, were retained as 
credits under the new activity tax regime. Alvarez & Marsal Holdings (2008) explain that these 
credits are not recorded as assets on the financial books of the firm, however, because SFAS 109 
applies only to taxes on income. Finally, there was special transition tax relief aimed at those 
firms with large NOL carryforwards, which would lose the ability to use these assets under the 32 
 
new tax regime. These policies provide transition relief to firms that were ‘owed’ tax relief under 
the income tax regime and that lost this prospective tax relief as a result of the tax reform.    
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
  This paper explores the role of temporary differences in contributing to the disparity 
between reported pretax book and estimated tax earnings for large U.S. corporations. Temporary 
differences comprise a substantial fraction of the book-tax income gap. Temporary differences 
that increase the book-tax income gap are larger than those that decrease it in our data sample. 
More than half of the firms in our sample have a net deferred tax liability, which reflects the 
accumulation of past excesses of book income over taxable income. Additionally, the average 
net deferred tax liability position is greater than the average net deferred tax asset position. 
  Firms exhibit substantial heterogeneity in their deferred tax positions. In 2004, more than 
forty percent of the firms in our sample of FORTUNE 50 companies reported a net deferred tax 
position valued at more than five percent of corporate assets. The observed heterogeneity 
suggests that firms may be affected in different ways by tax and accounting reforms. We 
estimate that roughly one third of the firms in our sample have strong incentives to shift income 
forward to maximize their use of NOL Carryforwards in response to a pre-announced reduction 
in the statutory corporate tax rate, while a large part of the sample likely has the opposite income 
shifting incentives. This heterogeneity also affects the impact of a statutory rate cut on Net 
Income. If the corporate tax rate had been reduced by five percentage points in 2004, then the 
average firm in our sample would have experienced a $328 million increase in Net Income due 
to the revaluation of its deferred tax positions. The average revaluation effect for a firm with a 
net deferred tax asset position is a $315 million decrease in Net Income while the average 
revaluation effect for a firm with a net deferred tax liability position is a $677 million increase. 33 
 
Understanding the disparate incentives created by deferred tax asset and liability positions is 
important for crafting transitional relief associated with changes in the structure of the corporate 
income tax.  
  The prospective importance of deferred tax assets and liabilities in affecting firm 
behavior and firm incentives is possibly even greater than the findings from our sample suggest. 
Many corporations are likely to experience growing deferred tax assets as a result of the 
recession that began in 2007. While the recently-extended NOL carryback period will enable 
some firms to draw down their deferred tax assets, the new tax provisions will not affect all 
firms.
27 Moreover, as new financial products provide firms with potentially greater control over 
the timing of income recognition, the magnitude of their behavioral response to transitory tax 
incentives associated with deferred tax assets and liabilities may increase. 
  Our descriptive findings suggest a number of possibilities for future research. The 
detailed information on deferred tax positions that we have collected may provide a starting point 
for studying the interplay between financial accounting for taxes and various aspects of corporate 
behavior. One particularly interesting question is how managers respond to the incentives created 
by deferred tax assets and liabilities. Their responses might involve political action in support of, 
or opposition to, policies that would be beneficial to, or costly for, their firms, or might involve 
changes in the investment or financing policies that are designed to take advantage of 
opportunities, or minimize burdens, associated with deferred tax positions. It may, for example, 
be possible to investigate whether firms that are large contributors to the campaigns of legislators 
who serve on tax-writing committees are particularly sensitive to the nature of tax reform insofar 
as they have large deferred tax positions. Data such as that collected for the current project 
                                                 
27 The Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 allows five-year NOL carryback for NOLs 
incurred in 2008 or 2009. This is only useful for firms with a tax loss in 2008 or 2009 who paid tax in 2003, 2004 or 
2005, since tax payments in those years were not "accessible" under the prior two-year carryback rules. 34 
 
provides a much richer description of the potential heterogeneous effect of tax policies created 
by cross-firm differences than does the more aggregate data reported in machine-readable 
databases, and it consequently makes it possible to test more refined hypotheses about firm 
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLES FIRMS AND YEARS IN SAMPLE 
 
Our sample was constructed based on FORTUNE magazine’s annual sales-based ranking 
of U.S. firms. The top 50 firms for each year from 1995 until 2004 were included in the sample. 
To mitigate the effects of changes in firm size in the net deferred tax analysis, the tax notes for 
all firms acquired or sold by FORTUNE 50 firms during the sample period were also included. 
For example, Berkshire Hathaway acquired General Re Corp in 1998, so the tax note information 
for General Re Corp was added to Berkshire Hathaway for years 1993-1997. Similarly, AMR 
Corp spun off Sabre in 2000, so going forward, tax note details for Sabre were added to AMR 
Corp for years 2000-2004. We use online firm histories and 10-Ks to research merger and 
acquisition activity. Four FORTUNE 50 firms were dropped due to insufficient disclosures:   
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, State Farm, and TIAA-CREF.  
 
For the net deferred tax descriptive analysis, the main FORTUNE 50 firm and all of its 
acquired and divested components were combined into a singe aggregate firm observation, 
summing over the deferred tax and liability categories as well as total assets and market values.  
 
The following 81 FORTUNE 50 “super-firms” are included in our sample:  Aetna Inc, 
Allstate Corp., Albertsons Inc, Altria Group, American Electric Power Co., American 
International Group Inc, AmerisourceBergen Corp., Amoco, AMR Corp, AOL Time Warner Inc, 
Aquila Inc, AT&T Corp, Bank of America Corp, BellSouth Corp, Berkshire Hathaway Inc, 
Cardinal Health, CenterPoint Energy Inc, Chevron Texaco Corp., Cigna Corp, Citigroup Inc, 
Chrysler, Coca-Cola Co, Columbia/HCA Health, ConAgra Foods Inc, ConocoPhillips, Costco 
Wholesale Corp., Dell Computer Corp, Dow Chemical Co, Duke Energy Co, Dynegy Inc, 
Eastman Kodak, El Paso Corp., Enron Corp, Exxon Mobil Corp, Ford Motor Co, General 
Electric Co, General Motors Corp, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Hewlett Packard Co., Home 
Depot Inc., Ingram Micro Inc., Intel Corp, International Paper Co, International Business 
Machines, ITT Industries Inc, J C Penney Corp Inc, J P Morgan Chase & Co, Johnson & 
Johnson, Kmart Holding Corp., Kroger Co., Lockheed Martin Corp, Loews Corp., Lowe's, 
Marathon Oil Corp, MCI Worldcom, McKesson Corp, Merck & Co Inc, Merrill Lynch & Co 
Inc, MetLife Inc, Microsoft Corp, Morgan Stanley, Motorola Inc, PepsiCo Inc, Pfizer Inc, 
Procter and Gamble Co, Prudential Financial Inc, Safeway Inc, Sara Lee Corp, SBC 
Communications Inc, Sears Roebuck Co, Supervalu Inc, Target Corp., The Boeing Co., United 
Parcel Service Inc, United Technologies, Valero Energy Corp, Verizon Communications Inc, 
Walgreen Co, Walmart, Wells Fargo & Co, Xerox Corp. 
 
The following 15 FORTUNE 50 firms are included in our sample as part of another super-
firm:  American Stores, included with Albertsons Inc; Bank One, included with J.P. Morgan 
Chase & Co; BankAmerica, included with Bank of America Corp; Bell Atlantic, included with 
Verizon Communications Inc; Chase Manhattan Corp, included with J.P. Morgan Chase & Co; 
Citicorp, included with Citigroup Inc; Compaq Computer, included with Hewlett Packard Co.; 
Conoco, included with ConocoPhillips; DuPont E I De Nemours & Co, included with 
ConocoPhillips; GTE, included with Verizon Communications Inc; Lucent, included with AT&T 
Corp.; Medco Health, included with Merck & Co Inc; Mobil, included with ExxonMobil Corp; 
Prudential Insurance, included with Prudential Financial Inc; Texaco, included with Chevron 
Texaco Corp. 39 
 
APPENDIX B: CLASSIFICATION OF DEFERRED TAX ASSETS AND LIABILITIES  
 
  Each deferred tax asset or liability category listed in a firm’s 10-K tax footnote is classified 
into one of the following aggregate categories:  
 
 Allowances for doubtful accounts 
 Employee benefits 
 Other (non-pension) post-employment benefits 
 Pensions 
 NOL carryforwards 
 Foreign tax credit carryforwards 
 Other tax credits and carryforwards 
 International activity-related 
 Inventory 
 Restructuring, merger & acquisition 
 Oil & Gas, environmental 
 Warranties 
 Valuation allowances 
 Expense-related 
 Mark-to-market adjustments 
 Intangible assets 
 Leases 
 Property, plant & equipment 
 Regulated accruals and deferrals 
 Revenue-related 
 U.S. State-related 
 Subsidiary-related 
 
Items that were too vague to categorize (e.g., ‘other adjustments’), included multiple categories 
(e.g., ‘A/R and inventory reserves’) or too unusual to warrant a category (e.g., ‘Bond Premiums’) 




APPENDIX C: CALCULATION EXAMPLE, THE COCA-COLA CO., 2004 
Baseline calculations, corresponding to entries in our dataset and tables: 
Pretax book income =$6222 
Taxable income =current tax expense/0.35 =$1213/0.35 =$3466 
Book-tax income gap =$6222 - $3466 =$2756 
Temporary differences =deferred tax expense/0.35 =$162/0.35 =$463 
Permanent and other differences =book-tax gap less temporary differences =$2756 -$463 =$2293 
While we believe the deferred tax method of calculating temporary differences suffers from fewer 
confounding factors than any other method, we present two alternative methods below. They, like 
our deferred tax method, contain noise, not bias. 
Alternative Method I 
One alternative method of calculating temporary differences uses the rate reconciliation to 
calculate permanent and other differences, and then defines temporary differences as the resulting 
residual. Reconciling items total 12.9% of pretax income. This translates to $803 tax dollars of 
permanent and other differences (12.9% x pretax income of $6222) or $2294 of permanent and 
other differences ($803/0.35) for Coca Cola Co. in 2004. When the firm discloses the 
current/deferred break down for their total tax provision (i.e. current tax expense plus deferred tax 
expense equals total tax provision), this alternative method results in the same figures as calculated 
using the first method. However, jurisdiction-specific disclosures and the tax effect of non-
recurring items often do not include current/deferred specifics. These disclosures confound this 
relationship and results in over- or under-stated temporary differences relative to the deferred tax 
expense method. 
Alternative Method II 
A third method of calculating temporary differences uses the change in the net deferred tax 
position, divided by the tax rate. For example, for Coca Cola, this would equal ($671-$235)/0.35. 
This alternative method results in a higher number than is calculated using the deferred tax 
expense. Text in the 10-K suggests that the discrepancy is due to a valuation allowance booked 
against foreign deferred tax assets. There are a number of other reasons why the change in 
deferred tax assets may not equal the deferred tax expense, including mergers and acquisitions, 
change in accounting standards and change in tax law or tax rates. As such, this method may also 
result in over- or understated temporary differences relative to the deferred tax method. 
 
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME  
The Coca-Cola Company and Subsidiaries  
Year Ended December 31,    2004  2003   2002 
 
INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAXES AND CUMULATIVE 
EFFECT OF ACCOUNTING CHANGE   6,222  5,495   5,499 
Income taxes    1,375  1,148   1,523 
 
NET INCOME BEFORE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF 
ACCOUNTING CHANGE    4,847  4,347   3,976 
Cumulative effect of SFAS No. 142, net of income taxes:                
   Company operations    —  —   (367)
   Equity investees    —  —   (559)
 
NET INCOME    $    4,847  $    4,347   $    3,050 41 
 
 Income tax expense (benefit) consists of the following (in millions):  




Local  International   Total  
  
2004                     
   Current    $    350  $  64  $  799   $  1,213  
   Deferred    209  29  (76)  162  
  A reconciliation of the statutory U.S. federal rate and effective rates is as follows:  
Year Ended December 31,    2004  2003  2002  
  
Statutory U.S. federal rate    35.0  % 35.0  % 35.0  % 
State income taxes—net of federal benefit   1.0  0.9  0.9  
Earnings in jurisdictions taxed at rates different 
from the statutory U.S. federal rate   (9.4)
1,2 (10.6)
7 (6.0) 




Other operating charges    (0.9)
5 (1.1)
9 —  
Write-down/sale of certain bottling investments   —  —  0.7  
11 
Other—net    (0.5)
6 (0.9) (0.9) 
  
Effective rates    22.1  % 20.9  % 27.7  % 
The tax effects of temporary differences and carryforwards that give rise to deferred tax assets and liabilities consist 
of the following (in millions):  
December 31,      2004      2003    
  
Deferred tax assets:                   
   Property, plant and equipment   $ 71   $  87    
   Trademarks and other intangible assets     65      68    
   Equity method investments (including translation adjustment)     530      485    
   Other liabilities      149      242    
   Benefit plans      594      669    
   Net operating/capital loss carryforwards     856      711    
   Other      257      195    
  
Gross deferred tax assets      2,522      2,457    
Valuation allowance      (854)    (630  ) 
  
Total deferred tax assets
1    $ 1,668   $  1,827    
  
Deferred tax liabilities:                   
   Property, plant and equipment   $ (684) $  (737  ) 
   Trademarks and other intangible assets     (247)    (247  ) 
   Equity method investments (including translation adjustment)     (612)    (468  ) 
   Other liabilities      (71)    (55  ) 
   Other      (180)    (211  ) 
  
Total deferred tax liabilities    $ (1,794) $  (1,718  ) 
  








Book-Tax Income Gap and Share Attributable to Temporary Differences, 1993-2004 






















1993 71  25.0    (2.5)  67.08%  (7,987.5)  (14,368.0)  179.9% 
1994  76  96.3   72.0   61.34   29,488.4   20,371.7   69.08 
1995  76  115.9   47.4   64.10   31,022.9   22,762.2   73.37 
1996  78  134.6   155.4   71.36   41,440.6   29,578.7   71.38 
1997  78  117.5   136.2   67.69   33,839.3   19,123.2   56.51 
1998  77  10.8   10.1   63.17   9,870.7   (2,534.0)  -25.67 
1999  77  251.0   245.7   93.20   83,660.6   67,123.7   80.23 
2000  78  219.7   238.9   80.97   67,715.3   63,341.0   93.54 
2001  78  180.8   142.0   82.22   (20,192.0)  (26,220.9)  129.86 
2002  78  302.3   144.1   71.24   2,246.1   42,485.6   1,891.52 
2003  78  736.0   477.1   75.62   139,877.3   68,004.2   48.62 
2004  78  607.4   296.6   66.63   89,942.7   18,694.0   20.78 
All data are hand-collected. Sample includes firms ranked in the Fortune 50 from 1995-2004. To standardize firms across time, firms engaged in merger,
acquisition, or divestiture activity with the Fortune 50 ranked firm are included with the Fortune 50 ranked firm to create a “super-firm.” The Book-Tax Income 
gap is calculated as Pretax Book Income less Taxable Income, where Taxable Income is calculated as Current Tax Expense divided by the maximum corporate 
statutory rate of 35% in all periods. Temporary differences are calculated as Deferred Tax Expense divided by 35%. Median Share Attributable to Temporary 
Differences is the median value of (Temporary Differences/Book-tax Income Gap) calculated at the super-firm level. Aggregate measures are computed by 










Sample Characteristics by Year, 1993-2004 









Std. Dev. of Net 
Deferred Tax 
Positions ($B) 
Super-Firms with Net DTA Super-Firms with Net DTL
Number  Aggregate 
Value ($B)  Number  Aggregate 
Value ($B) 
1993 71  $1,718  $5,202  $3.5  31  $52.2  40  -$79.7 
1994 76  1,804  6,328  3.3  35  52.7  41  -81.2 
1995 76  2,484  4,918  3.2  32  41.5  44  -83.7 
1996 78  3,199  5,719  3.4  31  43.8  47  -97.4 
1997 78  4,311  6,768  3.8  29  48.2  49  -110.5 
1998 77  5,764  7,295  4.0  33  56.9  44  -108.2 
1999 77  6,651  8,305  5.4  33  52.0  44  -148.0 
2000 78  6,468  9,340  6.2  31  58.3  47  -166.5 
2001 78  5,938  10,229  6.6  33  69.1  45  -181.6 
2002 78  4,543  10,625  7.3  33  94.1  45  -186.9 
2003 78  5,466  11,757  7.5  29  68.4  49  -226.9 
2004 78  5,800  13,302  7.0  27  65.4  51  -226.6 
 
All data are hand-collected except as noted. Sample includes firms ranked in the Fortune 50 from 1995-2004. To standardize firms across time, firms engaged in
merger, acquisition, or divestiture activity with the Fortune 50 ranked firm are included with the Fortune 50 ranked firm to create a “super-firm.”  Market 















Components of Net Deferred Tax Positions ($M), Average per Super-Firm, 1993-2004 
        1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Allowance  for  doubtful  accounts  206 193 206 226 239 264 250 212 283 287 255 244 
B e n e f i t s               
  
Employee  benefits  242 241 235 312 380 441 459 452 514 655 434 482 
Other  post-employment  benefits  519 522 526 481 432 365 348 328 335 395 377 318 
Pensions  -25  -65  -73  -103 -105  -82  -120 -129 -172 -117 -152 -207 
C r e d i t s   a n d   C a r r y f o r w a r d s               
    NOL  carryforwards  165 168 161 174 174 214 265 310 369 509 524 575 
   Foreign tax credit carryforwards  18  22  18  1  2  4  9  11  5  5  5  11 
  Other  tax  credits  &  carryforwards  182 190 183 176 197 186 214 215 241 379 435 452 
International  activity-related  6  4  6  4  22 24 34 44 37 48 -31  -75 
Inventory  15 16 18  9  13 15 12 17  8  5  2  -5 
Restructuring, Merger & Acquisition  205  141  113  80 45 43 13 -37 34 23  2  41 
Oil  &  Gas,  Environmental  23 22 27 17 11  4  4  -9  1  11 25 28 
Warranties  5 5 6 4 3 5 5 5  60  84  90  102 
Other Assets/Liabilities  454  451  463  456 489 548 556 628 398 517 413 545 
6 4 6 4 22 24 34 44 37 48 31 75 Valuation  allowance  -248 -268 -257 -243 -248 -186 -234 -255 -245 -615 -578 -688 
Expense-related  -40 -55 -55 -48 -36 -39 -65 -75 -97  -129  -169  -197 
Mark-to-market  adjustments  -117  -15  -193 -186 -276 -300 -361 -275 -286 -345 -451 -484 
P r o p e r t y               
    Intangible  assets  -148 -142 -143 -179 -166 -152 -327 -385 -394 -142 -351 -315 
    Leases  -208 -217 -227 -256 -280 -266 -293 -328 -333 -376 -365 -369 
   Property, plant & equipment  -1,479 -1,448 -1,416 -1,450 -1,500 -1,468 -1,584 -1,600 -1,707 -1,989 -2,057 -2,148 
Regulated accruals and deferrals  -17  -20  -21 -22 -29 -25 -32 -36 -35 -40 -43 -45 
Revenue-related  -139 -113 -114 -125 -132 -205 -220 -210 -219 -197 -178  -93 
U.S.  State-related  5  2 -2 -4 -9  -17  -20  -10  -6 -3 -1 1 
Subsidiary-related  Items  -13  -9  -17  -14  -23  -41  -161 -260 -237 -153 -219 -240 
17 20 21 22 29 25 32 36 35 40 43 45 Number  of  "Super-Firms"  in  Sample  71 76 76 78 78 77 77 78 78 78 78 78 
Number  of  Firms  in  Sample  201 223 233 285 268 236 193 170 149 134 126 120 
Information on deferred tax positions are hand collected from income tax disclosures in 10-K and Annual Report filings and assigned to 23 principal categories based on 






Detail of Select Components of Net Deferred Tax Positions ($M), Average per Super-Firm, 1993-2004 
      1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
B e n e f i t s                
  
Employee benefits 
DTA 269 276 303 391 452 501 542 536 534 681 572 633 
   DTL  -27 -35 -68 -79 -72 -60 -83 -84 -20 -26  -137  -151 
   Other post-employment 
benefits 
DTA 537 539 553 511 462 409 395 380 395 429 426 368 
   DTL  -18 -16 -27 -29 -30 -43 -46 -52 -60 -34 -48 -50 
  
Pensions 
DTA 51 35 43 29 34 42 18  1  9  39 40 36 
   DTL -76  -99  -115 -133 -139 -123 -138 -130 -181 -156 -192 -243 
Expense-related 
DTA 5  6  9  24 28 36 32 53 54 44 48 48 
DTL  -45 -61 -63 -72 -64 -75 -97  -128  -151  -173  -217  -246 
International activity-related 
DTA 24 33 35 43 60 76 90 99  118  137  118  111 
DTL  -18 -29 -29 -39 -39 -52 -56 -55 -80 -89  -150  -186 
Inventory-related 
DTA 32 38 39 36 36 43 48 52 50 53 53 44 
DTL  -17 -22 -21 -27 -24 -28 -36 -35 -41 -49 -52 -49 
Mark-to-market adjustments 
DTA 11 72  7  7  5  7  50 34 83  163  167  135 
DTL -127  -87  -200 -193 -281 -307 -411 -309 -369 -508 -617 -619 
Restructuring, Merger & 
Acquisition 
DTA 210  143  118  86 62 59 27 28 58 49 28 73 
DTL -5  -2  -5  -5  -17 -16 -14 -66 -24 -26 -25 -32 
Oil & Gas, Environmental 
DTA 35 33 35 30 27 18 16 18 22 25 40 44 
DTL  -13 -11  -8  -13 -16 -15 -12 -27 -20 -14 -15 -16 
Intangible assets 
DTA 44 46 46 44 54 61 47 36 50  116  131  136 
DTL -191 -188 -190 -223 -220 -213 -373 -422 -444 -257 -483 -451 
Regulated accruals and deferrals 
DTA 22  16  18  18  15  17  7 6 8 2 2 2 
DTL  -39 -36 -39 -39 -44 -42 -39 -43 -43 -42 -44 -47 
Revenue-related 
DTA 50 49 53 75 85 91 96  118  135  152  157  164 
DTL -189 -162 -167 -199 -217 -296 -316 -328 -354 -349 -335 -257 
U.S. State-related 
DTA 7 5 3 2 2 2 7 5 7 7 8  10 
DTL  -2 -2 -4 -5  -11  -19  -26  -15  -13  -10  -9 -9 
Hand-collected Information on deferred tax positions are assigned to 23 categories based on frequency and monetary significance of disclosure items. Amounts 







Distribution of Net Deferred Tax Positions as a Share of Firm Assets, 1993-2004 
Super-Firm Sample 
Year  Sample 
Size 
Firms with  
Net DTL/Assets in range (%) 
Firms with  
Net DTA/Assets in range (%) 
≤ -5 %  -5 to -3 %  -3 to 0 %  0 to 3 %  3 to 5 %  ≥ 5 % 
1993  71  25.4 5.6 25.4  31.0 2.8  9.9 
1994  76  27.6 5.3 21.1  35.5 6.6  3.9 
1995  76 21.1 13.2 23.7 31.6  5.3  5.3 
1996  78  23.1 6.4 30.8  25.6  10.3 3.8 
1997  78  23.1 7.7 32.1  25.6 7.7  3.8 
1998  77  22.1 9.1 26.0  28.6 7.8  6.5 
1999  77  27.3 5.2 24.7  31.2 6.5  5.2 
2000  78  25.6 5.1 29.5  28.2 5.1  6.4 
2001  78  24.4 5.1 28.2  25.6  10.3 6.4 
2002  78  23.1 7.7 26.9  25.6 2.6 14.1 
2003  78  26.9 3.8 32.1  21.8 6.4  9.0 
2004  78  25.6 9.0 30.8  19.2 7.7  7.7 
Individual Firm Sample 
Year  Sample 
Size 
Firms with  
Net DTL/Assets in range (%) 
Firms with  
Net DTA/Assets in range (%) 
≤ -5   -5 to -3 %  -3 to 0 %  0 to 3 %  3 to 5 %  ≥ 5 % 
1993  201  21.9 6.5 21.4  38.8 4.0  7.5 
1994  223  20.6 6.7 22.9  34.5 9.9  5.4 
1995  233  17.2 8.6 27.0  32.6 7.3  7.3 
1996  285  17.5 7.4 25.3  34.7 6.7  8.4 
1997  268  16.8 7.1 20.1  36.9 9.0 10.1 
1998  236  16.9 7.2 19.5  36.0 9.3 11.0 
1999  193  20.2 5.7 18.7  38.3 7.3  9.8 
2000  170  18.8 7.1 21.8  35.3 8.8  8.2 
2001  149  18.8 5.4 22.8  32.9 7.4 12.8 
2002  134  17.9 6.0 26.1  29.1 3.0 17.9 
2003  126  22.2  6.3  27.0 23.0 10.3 11.1 
2004  120  21.7 9.2 28.3  23.3 6.7 10.8 
 
All data are hand-collected. The distribution in the upper panel is calculated at the super-firm level; the distribution






Distribution of  Net Deferred Tax Positions as a Share of Firm Assets:  Financial and Non-
Financial Firms, 1993-2004 
Financial Firms 
Year  Sample 
Size 
Firms with  
Net DTL/Assets in range (%) 
Firms with  
Net DTA/Assets in range (%) 
≤ -5 %  -5 to -3 %  -3 to 0 %  0 to 3 %  3 to 5 %  ≥ 5 % 
1993 34  2.9  0.0  23.5  70.6  0.0  2.9 
1994 34  2.9  0.0  29.4  50.0  11.8  5.9 
1995 32  3.1  3.1  40.6  43.8  0.0  9.4 
1996 36  5.6  2.8  44.4  36.1  2.8  8.3 
1997 35  2.9  2.9  51.4  37.1  0.0  5.7 
1998 33  6.1  3.0  48.5  36.4  3.0  3.0 
1999 28  3.6  3.6  35.7  53.6  3.6  0.0 
2000 24  8.3  4.2  37.5  50.0  0.0  0.0 
2001 24  0.0  8.3  41.7  37.5  8.3  4.2 
2002 23  4.3  4.3  43.5  43.5  4.3  0.0 
2003 21  0.0  0.0  47.6  47.6  4.8  0.0 
2004 18  0.0  0.0  50.0  50.0  0.0  0.0 
Non-Financial Firms 
Year  Sample 
Size 
Firms with  
Net DTL/Assets in range (%) 
Firms with  
Net DTA/Assets in range (%) 
≤ -5 %  -5 to -3 %  -3 to 0 %  0 to 3 %  3 to 5 %  ≥ 5 % 
1993  167  25.7 7.8 21.0  32.3 4.8 8.4 
1994  189  23.8 7.9 21.7  31.7 9.5 5.3 
1995  201  19.4 9.5 24.9  30.8 8.5 7.0 
1996  249  19.3 8.0 22.5  34.5 7.2 8.4 
1997  233  18.9 7.7 15.5  36.9  10.3  10.7 
1998  203  18.7 7.9 14.8  36.0  10.3  12.3 
1999  165  23.0 6.1 15.8  35.8 7.9 11.5 
2000  146  20.5 7.5 19.2  32.9  10.3 9.6 
2001  125  22.4 4.8 19.2  32.0 7.2 14.4 
2002  111  20.7 6.3 22.5  26.1 2.7 21.6 
2003  105  26.7 7.6 22.9  18.1  11.4  13.3 
2004 102  25.5  10.8  24.5  18.6  7.8  12.7 
 
All data are hand-collected except as noted. The distributions are calculated with each individual firm as its own
observation. The sample parallels that of the individual firm analysis in the lower panel of Table 5. Industry is






Mean Impact of Federal Statutory Rate Decrease to 30% ($M), 1993-2004 































1994 66 2,606  4,841 -486  69  569  81  150 
1995 69 2,902  1,629 -463  66  615  88  154 
1996 69 3,542  2,243 -516  74  763 109 183 
1997 72 3,615  2,530 -574  82  767 110 192 
1998 69 3,484  2,884 -690  99  789 113 212 
1999 69 4,575  3,012 -580  83  1,121  160 243 
2000 69 5,152  2,142  -1,241  177  1,219  174 351 
2001 71 3,049  1,933  -1,466  209  578  83  292 
2002 72 2,785  140 -1,615  231  759 108 339 
2003 73 4,520  3,100  -1,438  205  876 125 330 
2004 74 5,302  3,625  -2,298  328  1,029  147 475 
Panel B: Super-Firms with Beginning of Period Net DTA 
1994 29 3,079  7,234  1,514  -216  656  94 -122 
1995 31 3,820  2,448  1,414  -202  778 111 -91 
1996 29 3,625  2,337  1,152  -165  683  98  -67 
1997 30 3,859  2,552  1,280  -183  658  94  -89 
1998 28 3,145  2,677  1,569  -224  589  84 -140 
1999 32 4,089  2,645  1,590  -227  881 126 -101 
2000 31 4,501  2,920  1,430  -204  952 136 -68 
2001 26 3,749  2,459  1,857  -265  608  87 -178 
2002 32 2,994  1,808  1,720  -246  537  77 -169 
2003 28 3,623  2,493  2,865  -409  629  90 -319 
2004 26 4,065  2,755  2,203  -315  721 103 -212 
Panel C: Super-Firms with Beginning of Period Net DTL 
1994 37 2,219  2,965  -2,054  293  501  72  365 
1995 38 2,145  960 -1,995  285  482  69  354 
1996 40 3,471  2,174  -1,724  246  820 117 363 
1997 43 3,428  2,514  -1,898  271  849 121 392 
1998 41 3,690  3,025  -2,232  319  922 132 451 
1999 37 4,971  3,329  -2,457  351  1,329  190 541 
2000 38 5,570  3,526  -3,421  489  1,437  205 694 
2001 45 2,644  1,629  -3,387  484  560  80  564 
2002 40 2,618  -1,194  -4,283  612  937 134 746 
2003 45 5,079  3,478  -4,116  588  1,029  147 735 
2004 48 5,973  4,097  -4,737  677  1,195  171 848 
All data are hand-collected. The sample is limited to firms who separately report Federal Tax Expense. We adjust 
Beginning of Period Net DTA for Credits, as discussed in Section V. All effects are calculated assuming a 30% 
Federal Statutory Rate, rather than the actual rate of 35%. 
 